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Crown. To a great extent, however, it was a case of makin~ whatever one
wished of the job, since there were few formal guidelines. 12
Canadian governments sought to emphasise national independence by
emphasising the position of the Governor-General at the expense of that of
the Sovereign. New Zealand, treading a path less determined by conscious
choice, found itself almost as it were by accident, with a Governor-General
empowered to exercise all the powers and responsibilities of a Head of
State.
The office of Governor-General has not been the means by which
New Zealand has achieved independence. But the increasing division of
the Crown meant that the Governor-General assumed more of the identity
of a Head of State. With the delegation of the royal prerogative, the
Governor-General became de facto Viceroy, but not a de facto president,
for he/she continued to represent, not simply the Sovereign, but the
concept of the Crown. But, unlike in Canada, not enough has been done to
clearly establish the Governor-General as a symbol of national identity.
The clearer this identification the lesser the prospects for rejection of the
system which the Crown represents.
Noel Cox
Lecturer in Law
Aukland University of Technology
126 Interview with Dame Catherine Tizard, 19 May 1998.
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Reducing the Solicitor's Burden?
Georgina Andrews
Introduction
The obligations of solicitors who advise wives who have been asked
to agree to charge their homes to secure their husband's business debts
came under scrutiny in the House of Lords in the recent landmark case of
Royal Bank ofScotland PLC v Etridge (No 2) and others!. The House of
Lords also clarified the obligations of banks and other lending institutions
involved in such transactions. An invitation to dispense with the
requirement for proof of manifest disadvantage in cases of presumed
undue influence was rejected by the House. Instead, the restriction of the
scope of the doctrine of presumed undue influence occasioned by the
introduction of the requirement for proof of manifest disadvantage was
confirmed.
The House of Lord's decision in Etridge determined the outcome of
eight appeals. Each appeal arose out of a transaction in which a wife
entered into a charge of her home to secure her husband's business debts.
In each case the wife claimed to have consented to the transaction as a
result of her husband's undue influence. In seven of the cases the wife
sought to defeat the bank's attempts to enforce the charge on the basis that
the bank had notice that the transaction had been procured as a result of
the husband's undue influence. The eighth appeal involved a claim
brought by a wife against the solicitor who advised her at the time when
she entered into the charge.
This article examines the decision of the House of Lords in Etridge 2
and considers the practical effects of the decision. In particular, this article
will focus on the obligations of solicitors who advise wives who have been
asked to agree to charge their homes to secure their husband's business
debts, and will seek to assess whether the decision represents a genuine
reduction in the onerous burdens which solicitors and other independent
legal advisers have hitherto been called upon to discharge.
I [2oo!] UKHL 44.
2 Ibid.
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The background to the decision will first be briefly explained. The
redirection of the requirements of presumed undue influence will then be
outlined, and the obligations of banks will be explored. Finally, the duties
of solicitors will be analysed. The writer will contend that although the
decision does significantly reduce the obligations of solicitors, it continues
to allow lenders to shield themselves from potential loss by shifting their
obligations on to independent legal advisers.
Background
What is undue influence? In his judgement, Lord Clyde questioned
the wisdom of attempting to define and still worse classify, something
which is more easily recognised than described.3 However in order to
assess the impact of the decision in Etridge it is necessary to briefly recall
the state of the doctrine ofundue influence prior to the decision. 4
In Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboodi the
Court ofAppeal classified undue influence as follows:-
Class 1: actual undue influence. This is where the claimant can prove
that undue influence was in fact exerted on the claimant to induce him
to enter into the contract.
Class 2: presumed undue influence. This is where the claimant can
show that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the
parties of such a nature that it is fair to presume that the trust and
confidence of the complainant was abused. Once the claimant can
establish the existence of the relationship of trust and confidence, the
burden of proof then shifts to the alleged wrongdoer to rebut the
presumption of undue influence, and to prove that the transaction was
entered into freely.
The Court of Appeal also identified two types of presumed undue
influence6•
3 n I above at [ 92].
4 Lord Browne-Wilkinson provides a masterly exposition of the doctrine of undue influence in the leading case
ofBarclays Bankplc v O'Brien and another [1993] 4 All ER 417, at p 423, 424.
, [1990] IQB 923, at p 953.
6 Ibid.
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Class 2A: recognised relationships oftrust and confidence. The law
recognises that certain types of relationships (for example the
relationship between solicitor and client, or doctor and patient) are
by definition relationships of trust and confidence. The presumption
of undue influence is automatically raised in cases involving
transactions between parties involved in these relationships, simply
by virtue of the existence of the relationship.
Class 2B: de facto relationships of trust and confidence. This is
where the claimant can prove that on the facts of the particular case,
there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties.
The relationship between a husband and wife no longer falls into
Class 2A. 7 However in individual cases a wife may be able to prove that
on the facts of her relationship she left decisions on financial affairs to her
husband (or vice versa8), thus bringing the particular relationship into
Class 2B.9
The marital relationship is not unique in this respect. A relationship of
trust and confidence can be found to exist on the facts of many other
relationships, such as the relationship between an unmarried couple lO, or
between a banker and a customer1" or an employer and an employeel2•
The marital relationship is the main focus of this article because that is the
relationship that arose in each of the eight appeals before the House in
Etridge. 13 However, the redirection of the requirements of presumed undue
influence applies to all relationships falling into Class 2.
The effect of a successful plea of undue influence is that the
transaction will be voidable. However, the right to rescission may be lost
if third party rights have been acquired by a person who is without notice
that the transaction was procured as a result of. undue influence. 14
7 Bank a/Montreal v Stuart [1911] AC 120.
8 Barclays Bank pic v Rivett [1999] I FLR 730.
9 Barclays Bankplc v O'Brien and another [1993] 4 All ER417.
10 Massey v Midland Bankplc [1995] IAII ER 929.
II Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326.
12 Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland v Burch [1997] IAII ER 144.
13 n I above.
14 Barclays Bank pic v 0 'Brien and another n 9 above.
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The Decision
1. The requirements of presumed undue influence
One ofthe most contentious issues concerning the doctrine of undue
influence prior to the House of Lords decision in Etridge,15 was as follows.
Should claimants seeking to invoke the presumption of undue influence be
required to prove that they have suffered 'manifest disadvantage' as a
prerequisite to shifting the burden ofproof on to the defendant?
The nature of the requirement for manifest disadvantage is in itself
controversial. The suggestion is that in cases involving presumed undue
influence, in order to invoke a shift in the burden of proof, it is not enough
simply to establish a relationship of trust and confidence. The claimant
must also satisfy the court that she has suffered a disadvantage as a result
of the transaction. Moreover, the degree of disadvantage occasioned to the
claimant, and the advantage taken, must be sufficiently clear and obvious
('manifest') so as to raise the presumption that the transaction is explicable
only on the basis that it has been procured by the exercise of undue
influence.
Lord Nicholls traces the origins of the requirement for manifest
disadvantage to the case of Allcard v Skinner. 16 In Allcard, Lindley LJ
stated that where a gift of a small amount is made, some proof of the
exercise of undue influence is required which goes beyond merely
establishing the existence of the influence. In other words, in cases
involving minor, insubstantial gifts, the claimant must prove actual undue
influence, and cannot simply rely on the presumption. This is because the
doctrine of undue influence applies only to transactions 'not to be
reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, relationship, charity
or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act.' 17
The principle established in Allcard18 was develored by the House
of Lords in National Westminster Bank PLC v Morgan. 1 In Morgan, Lord
Scarman stated that, pursuant to Allcard, in cases of presumed undue
15 n I above.
16 (1887) 36 ChD 145
17 Ibid at p 185.
IS Ibid.
19 [1985] AC 686.
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influence the courts would require evidence that the transaction constituted
'an advantage taken of the person subjected to the influence which, failing
proof to the contrary, was explicable only on the basis that undue influence
had been exercised to procure it'.zo
In the House of Lords decision in Etridge, Lord Nicholls was critical
of the label ('manifest disadvantage'), but he embraced the concept.
Blaming an inappropriate label for giving rise to ambiguity, Lord Nicholls
declared that the courts should abandon the label, and instead adhere more
closely to the test outlined by Lindley LJ in Allcard,21 and adopted by Lord
Scarman in Morgan.22 In short, Lord Nicholls pronounced that in cases of
presumed undue influence, the claimant must show that 'the transaction is
not readily explicable by the relationship between the parties'.23
Are the effects of this rejection of terminology and reaffirmation of
Allcard and Morgan merely cosmetic? Or does this decision represent a
genuine change of approach?
Lord Nicholls contemplated the application of the redefined
prerequisite to transactions where a wife guarantees her husband's
business debts. This was in essence the character of the transactions in
each of the eight appeals under consideration. Lord Nicholls rejected what
he described as the narrow interpretation of the term 'manifest'. He
identified, but dismissed the argument that in ordinary circumstances a
wife's guarantee of her husband's business overdraft was manifestly
(plainly) disadvantageous to the wife since she was undertaking a serious
financial obligation, and receiving no direct personal benefit.
Lord Nicholls declared that in most cases the fortunes of husbands
and wives were inextricably linked.24 His Lordship concluded that, in the
ordinary course of events, a guarantee entered into by a wife in respect of
her husband's business debts should not be regarded as a transaction which
'failing proof to the contrary, is explicable only on the basis that it has
20 Ibid at p 704.
21 n 19 above.
22 n 21 above.
23 n I above at [21].
24 This point was accepted in the recent Court ofAppeal decision in Leggatt v National Westminster Bank
(2000) WL 1544615. However the special facts ofLeggatt (which involved the replacement ofa valid
unlimited, all monies charge with a limited charge) rendered the case distinguishable. Interestingly in Leggatt
the wife was unable to satisfy even the less demanding test of showing that the transaction was not on it's face
to her financial advantage for the purposes of invoking the doctrine ofconstructive notice.
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been procured by the exercise ofundue influence by the husband' .25
The implications of this line of reasoning are potentially catastrophic for
WIves.
How, in the ordinary course of events, can a wife obtain relief on the
grounds of presumed undue influence in these circumstances? In the
ordinary course of events, it appears she cannot. 26 Even if a wife can
establish that on the facts of her particular circumstances, she placed trust
and confidence in her husband in respect of the management of her affairs,
this will not in itself be enough to invoke a shift in the burden of proof.
She must also satisfy the court that the transaction is one that is explicable
only on the basis that it has been procured by the exercise of undue
influence by her husband. In ordinary cases involving a guarantee by a
wife of her husband's business debts secured on the matrimonial home, the
wife will not be able to fulfil this requirement.
2. What is 'the ordinary course'?
The absence of direction in Etridge as to what constitutes 'the
ordinary course' is likely to lead to considerable uncertainty. Somewhat
ironically, adopting a narrow interpretation of what constitutes 'the
ordinary course' may represent an opportunity for the courts to ameliorate
the effects of Etridge in this regard.
3. Representations made by husbands
Having placed an often-insurmountable obstacle in the path of wives
seeking to obtain relief on the grounds of presumed undue influence, Lord
Nicolls was anxious to protect husbands from unwarranted connotations of
impropriety. His Lordship explained that 'when a husband is forecasting
the future of his business, and expressing his hopes or fears, a degree of
hyperbole may be only natural' . 27
Provided the husbands' statements or conduct do not pass beyond
what should be expected from a reasonable husband in the circumstances,
Lord Nicholls did not feel such exaggerations should be classed as
25 n 1 at [30].
26 Lord Nicholls made it clear that his comments applied in 'the ordinary course', hut he recognised that there
will be exceptional cases where explanation is called for.
27 n I at [32].
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misstatements. Thus the ability of wives to adduce evidence of
misrepresentation, which might provide an alternative path to relief was
also effectively inhibited.
4. Third party lenders
Like many undue influence cases· that appear before the courts, the
eight appeals under consideration in Etridge did not simply involve
allegations of undue influence raised by the claimant against the person
whom they claimed had exerted the undue influence. Rather the claims
were precipitated by the attempts of third party lenders to enforce
securities. In each case the guarantors claimed that they had been induced
to provide the security as a result of undue influence or misrepresentations
perpetrated by their husbands. In addition to ascertaining the existence or
otherwise of the undue influence, the House was therefore also concerned
with the effects of the undue influence on such third parties.
In the leading case of Barclays Bank pIc v 0 'Brien,28 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson invoked the doctrine of constructive notice in determining the
enforceability of securities by third party creditors in situations such as
these. Lord Browne-Wilkinson outlined circumstances in which a third
party creditor will be 'put on enquiry'. When these circumstances arise,
the creditor will be fixed with constructive notice of the undue influence
unless it takes reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the security has been
properly obtained. Only those creditors who are deemed to have
constructive notice of the undue influence will be affected by it.
In Etridge, Lord Nicholls examined the circumstances in which the
third party creditor will be 'put on enquiry'. His Lordship also clarified the
steps which the creditor should reasonably be expected to take in
satisfying itself that the security has been properly obtained.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated in O'Brien that 'a creditor is put on
enquiry when a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts by the
combination of two factors (a) the transaction is on its face not to the
financial advantage of the wife; and (b) there is a substantial risk... that in
procuring the wife to act as surety, the husband has committed a legal or
equitable wrong that entitles the wife to set aside the transaction' .29
28 n 9 above.
29 Ibid at p 429.
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Lord Nicholls interpreted this passage as meaning that 'quite simply,
a bank is put on enquiry whenever a wife offers to stand surety for her
husband's debts'. 30 Indeed, his Lordship later extends this rule to all cases
where the relationship between the parties is non-commercial.31
This interpretation clearly has the effect of putting banks on enquiry
more readily than the Court of Appeal previously envisaged in this case.
The Court of Appeal interpreted this passage as meaning that where
condition (a) is satisfied the creditor is only put on enquiry where it is
aware that the parties are cohabiting, or if it is aware that a relationship of
trust and confidence exists on the facts.32
In cases where monies are advanced to spouses jointly, Lord
Nicholls found that the creditor will not be put on inquiry unless it is
aware that the loan is being made for one party's sole purposes, rather than
for the couple's joint purposes. 33
However, creditors should not be unduly alarmed by this
development, since although they will be put on notice more readily, the
steps which they are required to take, are clear and simple. As Lord
Nicholls states, 'in all conscience, it is a modest burden for banks and
other lenders'.34 Incorporating these steps into standard banking practices
could easily discharge the creditor's obligations without causing undue
difficulties.
Namely, for future transactions, 35 a bank must either:
(a) Insist that the wife attends a private meeting with a bank
representative where the extent of her liability and the risks
involved will be explained, and she will be urged (and in
exceptional cases required) to take independent legal advice,
or
(b) Require the wife to seek independent legal advice.
30 n I at [44].
31 n I at [87].
32 [1988] 4 All ER 705, at p 719.
33 See also Wright v Cherrytree Finance Ltd [2001] EWCA ClY 449, where a creditor was found to have been
put on inquiry despite the fact that the advance cheque was payable to joint names, since the cheque could be
easily converted into a cheque payable to one party for his sole purpose.
34 n I at [87].
" For past transactions, in ordinary cases the bank will be able to rely upon confinnation from a solicitor that he
had brought home to the wife the risks that she was running.
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If option (b) is selected, the creditor will have an obligation to provide any
information required by the independent legal adviser, but it will ordinarily
be entitled to rely upon confirmation36 from a solicitor acting for the wife
that he has provided appropriate advice.37
In his speech to the House of Lords in Etridge, Lord Hobhouse
described the widespread reluctance of banks to carry out personal
interviews with wives themselves as opposed to entrusting such interviews
to solicitors as 'sad'. 38 His Lordship also referred critically to the practice
of allowing banks to treat a certificate provided by a solicitor as conclusive
evidence that it has no notice of any undue influence that has occurred,
particularly since the made information available to the solicitor by the
bank was often incomplete. His Lordship stated that 'The law has, in order
to accommodate the needs of commercial lenders, adopted a fiction which
nullifies the equitable principle and deprives vulnerable members of the
public of the protection which equity gives them' .39
It is likely that most third party lenders will prefer to carry on their
current normal practice of requiring wives to seek independent legal
advice, since this enables them to shield themselves from potential loss by
shifting their obligations on to independent legal advisers. 40 However, the
procedural guidelines contained in Etridge, which require banks to provide
the legal adviser with full details of the proposed transaction, should at
least help to ensure that the advice is well founded.
5. The obligations of independent legal advisers
The obligations of independent legal advisers were also scrutinised
by Lord Nicholls.41 His Lordship sensibly acknowledged that in some
36 Detailed guidance is offered to banks concerning the steps it should take in obtaining the solicitor's
confirmation, see n I at [79).
37 Lord Nicholls rejected the argument that the solicitor should be regarded as the agent of the bank.
Deficiencies in the legal advice provided will not therefore be attributed to the bank, and knowledge gained by
the solicitor will not be imputed to the bank.
38 n I at [113).
39 n I at [116).
40 See also Burrows D, [200 I) Law Gazette, 23 November.
41 Lord Nicholls left solicitors to determine on a case-by-case basis whether there is any conflict of interests
between a husband and wife, or whether it would be in the best interests of the wife for her to be separately
represented. If instructions are accepted from the wife the solicitor will assume legal and professional
responsibilities directly to her, and advice should be offered at a face-to-face meeting, in the absence of the
husband.
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respects the burdens placed on solicitors by the Court of Appeal went
much too far. Lord Nicholls found that, contrary to the findings of the
Court of Appeal, there is in fact no obligation in the ordinary course of
events for the solicitor to satisfy himself that the wife is free from undue
influence. 'To require such an intrusive, inconclusive and expensive
exercise in every case would be an altogether disproportionate response,.42
Instead Lord Nicholls declared that the solicitor's duty is confined to
bringing home to his client the risks involved in the proposed arrangement.
The solicitors' profession has not surprisingly, welcomed the
reduction of the obligations placed on solicitors. Jeremy Scott of the
Solicitors Indemnity Fund is reported to have said: "A solicitor
specialising in conveyancing and mortgages cannot also be expected to be
an expert in company finance and psychology. If this decision had not
been overturned by the Lords, many solicitors would have had to refuse to
handle routine transactions.'>43
The precise steps that the solicitor will have to undertake to
discharge this obligation are set out clearly, and in detail, in Lord Nicholls'
judgment.44 In summary, Lord Nicholls stated that the solicitor should
cover the following matters as a core minimum:-
1. Explain the nature and content of the documents,
including the consequences that could ensue in the event
of default by the husband.
2. Explain the serious nature of the risks involved,
including the purpose, amount and main terms of the
new facility and the risk that the credit might be
extended.
3. Explain that the wife has a choice, including a discussion
of the present financial position, and a discussion of any
matters that might be negotiable, such as the sequence in
which the various securities might be called upon, or a
specific lower limit to the wife's liabilities.45
42 n I at [53].
43 MacCallum V, 'Lords Reduce the Duty to Wives.' [2001] Law Gazelle, 19 October.
44 n I at [64] to [68].
45 For a further discussion of the steps which independent legal advisers are required to take see also Pines
Richman H, The Etridge Mortgage Cases: A Review. '[2001] NLJ 1541.
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The duties of independent legal advisers are therefore clearly
significant, and should not be underestimated. However, Lord Nicholls is
realistic about what should be expected from independent legal advisers,
and the extent of their duties is more clearly defined and contained.
6. The requirement for the solicitors' certificate
Solicitors will no doubt be concerned that banks may seek to suggest that
the requirement that banks should obtain a written confirmation from the
solicitor that he has brought home to the wife the risks that she was running
creates a duty of care between the solicitor and the bank.
However, they will take comfort from Lord Nicholls' finding that 'When
accepting instructions to advise the wife the solicitor assumes responsibilities
directly to her... these duties...are owed to the wife alone..'46 Lord Nicholls also
specifically rejects the argument that the solicitor can be regarded as the agent
of the bank,47 and states further, 'The solicitor is not accountable to the bank for
the advice he gives to the wife' and 'deficiencies in the advice are a matter
between the wife and the solicitor,.48
Conclusions
What are the practical implications of the decision of the House of Lords
in Etridge? Has the decision in fact succeeded in improving protection for wives
without deterring lenders from extending credit to businesses on the security of
jointly owned property?
It would be naive to suppose that it would ever be possible to
provide absolute protection against abuse of influence, especially in the
circumstances of the type of cases under appeal before the House. No
amount of explanation, investigation or probing by creditors or
independent legal advisers will ever guarantee the absence of abuse of
influence exerted subtly and in private, within the contexts of relationships
as complex and intimate as matrimony.
Etridge at least ensures that the limited safeguards that equity can
provide will be triggered more easily and more frequently than hitherto. It
also provides models of good practice for creditors and independent legal
advisers that are reasonably clear, workable and considerably more
realistic. The burdens placed upon solicitors involved in cases of this kind
46 nl at [74].
47 n37.
48 nl at [77].
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have undoubtedly been reduced by this decision. However, their
obligations remain considerable, and banks continue to enjoy the ability to
minimise their risk of potential loss at the expense of independent legal
advisers.
In his speech to the House of Lords, Lord Hobhouse stated that if the
procedures spelled out by Lord Nicholls are adhered to (by both the
solicitor and the bank), there is a greater likelihood that 'the fiction of
independent advice and consent49 should be replaced by true independent
advice and real consent'.50 If this is indeed the outcome of the case then
the decision will have succeeded, in practical terms, in restoring to
vulnerable members of the public some of the protection which equity
aims to provide.
Georgina Andrews
Senior Lecturer in Law
Southampton Institute
49 referred to at n 31 above.
'On I at [121).
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